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Ellerbe: Environmental Law - Strict Liability for Oil Spills in Wyoming -

CASE NOTES

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-Strict Liability for Oil Spills In Wyoming. People v.
Platte Pipe Line Company, 649 P.2d 208 (Wyo. 1982).

On April 8, 1980, a pipeline owned and operated by the
Platte Pipe Line Company (Platte Pipeline) ruptured and
discharged an estimated 8,552 barrels of crude oil into the
North Platte River in Converse County, Wyoming.1 The discharge contaminated sixty-eight river miles and caused considerable damage to the river's ecosystem.2 County, state and
federal agencies monitored a cleanup effort conducted by
Platte Pipeline3 that lasted twenty-five days and recovered approximately ninety-five percent of the oil discharged. 4 By
March 25, 1981 the Wyoming Game and Fish Department had
expended $48,325 and the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) had expended $4,290 as a result of the
spill. 5
On March 25, 1981, the Wyoming Attorney General filed a
civil complaint against Platte Pipeline in the Eighth Judicial
District Court of Wyoming, pursuant to the provisions of the
Wyoming Environmental Quality Act of 1973 (EQA).6 The
complaint alleged, among other things, that Platte Pipeline
had violated section 35-11-301 of the Wyoming Statutes
because its pipeline had discharged pollution into state waters
without a permit from DEQ. 7 The company was therefore
allegedly liable for the civil penalties set out in section
Copyright@ 1983 by the University of Wyoming.
1. People v. Platte Pipe Line co., 649 P.2d 208, 209 (Wyo. 1982).
2. W life killed as a result of the spill included 1,752 muskrats, 4 beavers, 1 raccoon, 19
geese, 109 ducks, and 183 goose eggs. Id.
3. Platte Pipeline claimed to have spent $1,285,995.21 for repair of the pipeline, for clean-up
and containment costs, and for third party damage claims. The company sued Mountain
States Telephone & Telegraph (Mountain Bell) for negligence in conducting excavation
that had allegedly damaged the pipeline some five years earlier. Complaint, 7th Jud. Dist.
Court of Wyo., Docket No. 50129, pt. II, counts no. 6 and 8.
4. People v. Platte Pipe Line Co., 649 P.2d at 209 (Wyo. 1982).
5. Id.
6. Id, The Wyoming Environmental Quality Act (EQA) is codified at WYO. STAT.
SS 35-11-101 to -1104 (1977). WYO.STAT. S35-11-901(q) (Supp. 1982) provides in relevant
part: "All actions pursuant to this article shall be brought in the county in which the violaST
tion occurred or in Laramie county by the attorney general ....
7. People v. Platte Pipe Line Co., 649 P.2d at 210 (Wyo. 1982). Wyo. STAT. S35-11-301
(1977) [hereinafter referred to as section 301] provides in relevant part:
(a) No person, except when authorized by a permit issued pursuant to the provisions of this act, shall:
(i) Cause, threaten or allow the discharge of any pollution or wastes into
the waters of the state;
(i) Alter the physical, chemical, radiological, biological or bacteriological
properties of any waters of the state....
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35-11-901(a) and (h) of the Wyoming Statutes. 8 Specifically,
the State prayed for $10,000 for each day of the violation, 9 as
well as an unspecified sum as compensation for the habitat and
wildlife destroyed. 10 The complaint also alleged that Platte
Pipeline had violated section 311 of the federal Clean Water
Act (CWA), 11 and thus, that the State was entitled under section 311 (f)(4) and (5) to recover for costs incurred2 in the
restoration of resources destroyed by the discharge.
Subsequently, Platte Pipeline filed a motion to dismiss the
case pursuant to Rules 12 and 19 of the Wyoming Rules of
Civil Procedure.13 The district court granted Platte Pipeline's
motion under Rule 12 because the State's complaint had failed
4
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.1
On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court overruled the
district court, finding that the State had made a valid claim for
relief.' 5 The court held that section 301 imposed strict liability
8. People v. Platte Pipe Line Co., 649 P.2d at 210 (Wyo. 1982). WYO. STAT. S 35-11-901
(Supp. 1982) [hereinafter referred to as section 901] provides in part:
(a) Any person who violates... any provision of this act... is liable to... a
penalty of not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) for each day
during which violation continues....
(b) Except for surface coal mining operations, damages are to be asessed by
the court.
(h)

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

15.

Any person who violates this act .... and thereby causes the death of fish,
aquatic life or game or bird life is... liable to pay to the state, an additional sum for the reasonable value of the fish, aquatic life, game or bird
life destroyed. Any monies so recovered shall be placed in the general fund
of Wyoming, state treasurer's office.
(j) Any person who willfully and knowingly violates.., any provision of this
act shall be fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00)
per day of violation, or imprisoned for not more than one (1) year, or both.
If the conviction is for a violation committed after a first conviction of
such person under this act, punishment shall be by a fine of not more than
fifty-thousand dollars ($50,000.00) per day of violation or by imprisonment of not more than two (2) years, or both.
Prayer, 8th Judicial Dist. Court of Wyo., Docket No. 8564, count no. 2. The complaint
alleged that the violation had continued for 25 days. Complaint, 8th Judicial Dist. Court
of Wyo., Docket No. 8564, count no. 21.
Prayer, supra note 9, at count no. 3.
Complaint, supra note 9, at count no. 17. Section 311 of the CWA is codified at 33 U.S.C.
S 1321 (1976). The complaint referred to the CWA by its old name, the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act.
Prayer, supra note 9, at count no. 4.
People v. Platte Pipe Line Co., 649 P.2d at 210 (Wyo. 1982).
Id. Wyo. R. Civ. P. 12(bX6) requires that the plaintiff state a claim upon which relief can
be granted by the court. "The Court thus agreed with Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
which states that the Complaint failed to'... allege facts which are cognizable under the
cited statutes ....... "Brief of Appellants at 10, People v. Platte Pipe Line Co., 649 P.2d
208 (Wyo. 1982). The district court believed that section 301 did not impose strict liability; therefore a showing of fault on the part of the defendant was required before section
301 could be considered violated. 649 P.2d at 210.
649 P.2d at 214.
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for any unpermitted discharge of pollution into waters of the
state. Consequently, the operator of a pipeline that had
discharged such pollution would be subject to the penalties of
section 901 regardless of fault on its part.' 6 The case was
remanded to district court on August 5, 1982.17
The parties settled the case on December 1, 1982. Platte
Pipeline agreed to pay the State the following sums:
18
1) $5,000 pursuant to the penalty provision of section 901(a).
2) $15,249.30 pursuant to the wildlife compensation provision
of section 901(h). 19
3) $30,447.79 to the Wyoming Game and Fish Department
and $1,037 to DEQ as reimbursement for the costs those
agencies incurred in responding to the oil spill.20

BACKGROUND: FEDERAL AND STATE WATER
POLLUTION LEGISLATION

FederalLegislation
The first federal statute to deal with water pollution was
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,21 but the modern era of
federal water pollution legislation can be said to have begun
with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972 (FWPCAA).22 The FWPCAA adopted several goals and
policies for the nation:
1) The elimination of all discharge of pollutants into the
navigable waters of the nation by 1985.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id. at 209.
Consent Decree, 8th Judicial Dist. Court of Wyo., Docket No. 8564, no. 9.
Consent Decree, supra note 18, at no. 8. The lost wildlife was evaluated on the basis of a
"hunter-recreation day" or on the basis of pelt value, where applicable. Id. Section 901(h)
is quoted above at note 8.
20. Consent Decree, supra note 18, at no. 7. The State had originally prayed for $48,325 for
the Game and Fish Department and $4,290 for DEQ. Prayer, supra note 9, at count no. 4.
21. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1121 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 33 U.S.C.). See J. B. Battle, Environmental Law: Part IV: The Clean Water Act 6 (Apr.
1982) (unpublished). For a short summary of the history of federal water pollution legislation, see Comment, Spilling Oil May Be Hazardous To Your Wealth, 19 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 735, 736 (1979).
22. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, codified at 33 U.S.C. SS 1251-1376 (1976). In 1977, the
FWPCAA was amended and renamed the Clean Water Act (CWA). Pub. L. No. 95-217,
91 Stat. 1566 (1977) [The FWPCAA will hereinafter be referred to in text by its new
name, CWA, where appropriate].
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2) An interim goal of water quality that protects fish,
wildlife and recreational use, to be achieved by 1983.
3) Prohibition of the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic
amounts.
4) Federal financial assistance to construct publiclyowned waste treatment works.
5) A major research effort to develop the technology
necessary to achieve these goals.
6) The preservation of the primary responsibility of the
23
states to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution.
The FWPCAA established, among other things, the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES),24
which is a permit system for water polluters. Anyone wishing
to discharge any kind of pollution into the nation's waters must
first obtain a permit to do so from the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).25 These permits are
based on a comprehensive set of effluent standards issued by
the Administrator, 26 and any discharge without a permit is
unlawful.27 This prohibition is fundamental to the entire
FWPCAA. 28 Persons who willfully or negligently violate the
provisions of the NPDES are subject to a criminal penalty of
up to $25,000 per day of violation and/or imprisonment for up
to one year. 29 Other violators are subject to a civil penalty of up
to $10,000 per day of violation.30 The language of section
301(a) of the FWPCAA,3 1 together with the fact that separate
penalties are imposed for negligent and non-negligent
violators, indicates that the NPDES is based in strict
liability. 32 The NPDES also contains a provision that allows
each state to establish its own permit system, and if the state
system is in compliance with federal standards it will replace
the federal system in that state. 3
23. 33 U.S.C. S 1251(a) and (b) (1976). See generally Battle, supra note 21, at 6-19.
24. 33 U.S.C. S 1342 (1976).

25. 33 U.S.C. S 1311 (1976).
26. 33 U.S.C. S 1312 (1976).
27. 33 U.S.C. S 1311 (1976).
28. American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

29. 33 U.S.C. S 1319(cXl) (Supp. V 1981).
30. 33 U.S.C. S 1319(d) (Supp. V 1981).

31. Section 301(a) is codified at 33 U.S.C. S 1311(a) (1976), and provides in part: "Except as
in compliance with this section.. . the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be
unlawful."
32. United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 374 (10th Cir. 1979).
33. 33 U.S.C. S 1342(b) (1976).
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Another portion of the FWPCAA was designed to deal
with oil spills in the nation's navigable waters. Section 311 of
the FWPCAA34 is entitled "Oil and Hazardous Substance
Liability." The section declares it to be national policy that
there be no discharges of oil or hazardous substances into the
nation's navigable waters,35 and any such discharge in harmful
quantities is prohibited.3 8 The section establishes two kinds of
liability. First, there is a fine of up to $5,000 for each offense,
to be assessed against the owner, operator, or person in charge
of the facility from which the oil is discharged.3 7. There are no
defenses s8 because the purpose is to clean up pollution, not to
effect retribution.3 9 Second, the responsible party is liable for
up to $50,000,000 to the state or federal government for any
expenses their agencies incur in clean-up operations (including
expenses for the restoration or replacement of natural
40
resources).
The party is excused from liability under this provision,
however, if it can prove that the discharge was caused by 1) an
act of God, or 2) an act of war, or 3) negligence of the United
41
States Government, or 4) an act or omission of a third party.
In anticipation of the fact that these defenses will be used and
that the government will be paying for clean-up when the
defenses are successful, a $35,000,000 fund is established for
that purpose from general revenue and from any fines col42
lected under the first penalty provision.
Finally, section 311 of the FWPCAA explicitly disclaims
any federal preemption of state laws that impose liability for
the discharge of oil or hazardous substances. 4 Therefore, the
states are free to impose any kind of penalty they choose in
these matters, even though that penalty may exceed in amount
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Section 311 is codified at 33 U.S.C. S 1321 (1976).
33 U.S.C. S 1321(bXl) (1976).
33 U.S.C. S 1321(bX3) (1976).
33 U.S.C. S 1321(bX6XA) (Supp. V 1981).
"Section 1321(bX6) provides no defense to the assessment of the civil penalty; indeed, it
establishes an absolute liability standard which obviates the need for a finding of fault."
United States v. Coastal States Crude Gathering Co., 643 F.2d 1125, 1127 (5th Cir.
1981).

39. Ward v. Coleman, 423 F. Supp. 1352, 1356 (D. Okla. 1976), rev'd, 598 F.2d 1187 (10th
Cir. 1979), rev'd sub nom United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
40. 33 U.S.C. S 1321(f)(3) and (4) (Supp. V 1981).
41. 33 U.S.C. S 1321(fX)(3) (Supp. V 1981).
42.33 U.S.C. S1321(k) (Supp. V 1981).
43. 33 U.S.C. S 1321(oX2) (1976).
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the penalties imposed by section 311, and
even though the
44
polluter may be subject to double liability.
State Legislation
In 1973, the Wyoming legislature enacted the Wyoming
Environmental Quality Act (EQA)45 in response to the
FWPCAA and to growing environmental concern locally. The
EQA was designed to control air, water and land pollution, and
it reorganized Wyoming's statutory and administrative environmental protection systems.4 6 The EQA opens with a
broad declaration of legislative intent:
[I]t is hereby declared to be the policy and purpose
of this act to enable the State to prevent, reduce and
eliminate pollution; . . .to preserve and exercise the
primary responsibilities and rights of the state of
Wyoming; to retain for the state the control over its air,
land and water ....47
Article three of the EQA is entitled "Water Quality" and
is the first comprehensive water pollution control legislation to
be enacted in Wyoming. 48 Section 301 contains the basic prohibition of the article: no person without a permit shall cause,
threaten or allow the discharge of pollution into state waters;
nor shall such person alter the various properties of these
waters.4 9 The penalties and compensatory provisions for violation of section 301 are found elsewhere in the EQA at section
901.50 These provisions include 1) a penalty of up to $10,000
per day of violation, 51 up to $25,000 per day if the violation is
willful, 52 2) reimbursement to the state for the value of wildlife
killed,53 and 3) damages to be assessed by the court.54 Section
44. See Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 620-21 (4th Cir. 1979).
45. 1973 Wyo. SEss. LAWS Ch. 250, S 1 codified at Wyo. STAT. S 35-11-101 to -1207 (1977 &
Supp. 1982).
46. Comment, Wyoming EnvironmentalQuality Act of1973: Introduction,9 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 65 (1974).

47. WYo. STAT. S 35-11-102 (1977).

48. Comment, Wyoming EnvironmentalQuality Act of1973: Section II. The Wyoming Water
Quality Act And The Federal Water PollutionControl Act Amendments of1972: A Cornparison, 9 LAND & WATER L. REv. 79 (1974).
49. Wyo. STAT. S 35-11-301(aXi) and (ii) (1977). The language is quoted above at note 7.
50. WYo. STAT. S 35-11-901 (Supp. 1982). The language is quoted above at note 8.
51. WYO.STAT. S 35-11-901(a) (Supp. 1982).
52. Wyo. STAT. S 35-11-901() (Supp. 1982).
53. WYo. STAT. S 35-11-901(h) (Supp. 1982).

54. WYo. STAT. S 35-11-901(b) (Supp. 1982). One could not imagine a provision more vague
and all-inclusive that this third one. This provision could possibly include clean-up costs or
any other costs incurred by the State, but it is more likely that it only refers to damages
provided for elsewhere in section 901.
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302 defines the various duties of the Administrator of the
Water Quality Division within DEQ. Article three specifies no
water quality standards whatsoever; rather, the Administrator is directed to recommend to the Director of DEQ
any regulation or standard he deems necessary to prevent
pollution of the state's waters.55
Comparison of State and FederalLegislation
One of the Water Quality Administrator's duties is to
establish and manage a state-wide permit system that will be
in compliance with the NPDES 56 so that DEQ can administer
the permit program rather than EPA. In this way the state retains control over pollution affecting its waters. It should be
emphasized, however, that compliance with the NPDES is not
the only purpose that article three seeks to accomplish. It was
intended to be comprehensive pollution control legislation, not
merely to create a replica of the federal permit system. For example, NPDES applies only to point sources of pollution 5 but
article three contains no such specific limit in its language.
Therefore, the article seems to apply to all kinds of water
pollution, both point source and non-point source. 8
The vagueness of the language in article three creates inevitable problems in deciding whether the EQA covers certain
kinds of water pollution that are outside the scope of NPDES
but are within the CWA as a whole. Article three of the EQA
was definitely a response to the CWA,5 9 but it does not
necessarily follow that the procedures and principles that appear in the various sections of the CWA were to serve as a
model for article three. For example, the federal penalties for
violation of a federal NPDES permit do not apply to the owner
55. WYO. STAT. S 35-11-302(a) (1977). Prevention of pollution of the State's waters is one of
the purposes of the act. See supra text accompanying note 47.
56. Wyo. STAT. S 35-11-302(aXv) (1977).
57. 33 U.S.C. S 1311(e) (1976). See also Comment, supra note 48, at 80.
58. The CWA and the EQA contain identical definitions of the term "point source." "' Point
source' means any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not
limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation or vessel or other floating craft, from
which pollutants are or may be discharged... ." WYO. STAT. S 35-11-103(aXx) (1977). See
also 33 U.S.C. S 1362(14) (1976).

59. The CWA was natned the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 at
the time the EQA was enacted. "There is no question that the impetus for the act and its
structure was ... the Federal Water Quality Act Amendments of 1972." Comment,
supra note 48, at 79.
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of a facility that has spilled oil into navigable waters. 60 The
CWA has a special section that covers that kind of event, 61 and
penalties imposed by the two sections are mutually exclusive. 62
Does this mean that the penalties imposed by the EQA for
violation of its permit system likewise do not cover oil spills in
Wyoming? The argument that article three, like the federal
NPDES, covers only pollution discharges for which a permit
could have been obtained, but was not, was cogently made by
Platte Pipeline in the district court 63 and evidently accepted, in
spite of the fact that such an interpretation would have left the
EQA powerless to punish the worst conceivable kinds of pollu64
tion-those for which a permit would never be available.
When one considers the enormous difference between the
federal and state acts in terms of structure and level of complexity, any argument by analogy is likely to be of limited
value. Article three obviously emulates the CWA more in spirit
than it does in organization. When problems of statutory construction of article three arise in the Wyoming courts, judges
will do far better to consider the plain language of the text and
the purposes that the act was meant to accomplish than to attempt some analogy with a particular section of the CWA.
A Case of FirstImpression
Wyoming case law interpreting the EQA in the ten years
since its enactment is almost non-existent. In a 1976 case, the
EQA was cited as an example of new administrative legislation
that is the trend in Wyoming. 65 In another 1976 case, the court
upheld a penalty assessed to a town for failure to obtain a permit before constructing a waste disposal site.66 In 1980, the
court upheld a similar penalty for failure to obtain a permit
before installing a public water supply system. 67 The court did
60. See 33 U.S.C. S 1319 (Supp. V 1981).
61. 33 U.S.C. S 1321 (Supp. V 1981). See supra text accompanying notes 35-44 for a discussion of this section.
62. 33 U.S.C. S 1321(bX6)(E) (Supp. V 1981).
63. Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 4-5, 8th Judicial Dist. Court of
Wyo., Docket No. 8564.
64. Note, however, the Platte court's treatment of this point. See infra text accompanying
note 73.
65. Board of Trustees v. Spiegel, 549 P.2d 1161, 1170 n.13 (Wyo. 1976).
66. Town of Torrington v. Environmental Quality Council, 557 P.2d 1143 (Wyo. 1976).
67. Nickelson v. People, 607 P.2d 904 (Wyo. 1980). The court held that the penalties provided
by the EQA were civil, not criminal, and therefore the appellant's fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination did not apply when he was assessed a penalty under the EQA.
Id. at 909.
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not specifically define the scope of article three in any of these
cases, not did it determine the degree of culpability necessary
to constitute a violation of section 301. As a result, Platte
Pipeline was correct to make this statement in its brief on appeal: "This is a case of first impression. The Supreme Court
has not had an opportunity to have before it a case in which the
alleged violator has contested the Department's power to
regulate oil spills.''68
THE COURT'S DECISION

The Wyoming Supreme Court pointed out that it needed to
decide only one question of statutory interpretation in order to
adjudicate Platte: Does section 301 of the EQA impose liability
upon the operator of a crude oil pipeline that has discharged
pollution into state waters? 69 The court broke the question
down into two narrower questions:
1) Does section 301 cover only those kinds of pollution for
which a permit could have been obtained but was not, or
does it cover unpermittable oil spills as well? 0
2) Does section 301 impose strict liability upon the owners
of polluting facilities or does it require some form of
negligence or scienter? If strict liability is called for, the
operator's negligence is irrelevant and would not have
to be alleged by the State in order to state a claim for
relief.71
The court's rationale was simple and direct. It answered the
first question by deciding that a pipeline leaking oil into a river
was a discharge of pollution into state waters within the meaning of section 301.72 Platte Pipeline's argument equating article three with the federal NPDES and categorizing it as a
limited permitting statute was dismissed by the court as "undiluted sophistry" because it ignored the Act's stated purpose
of reducing and preventing pollution."3 Such an argument
would have rendered the Act ineffectual.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Brief of Appellee at 49, People v. Platte Pipe Line Co., 649 P.2d 208 (Wyo. 1982).
649 P.2d at 209.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 214.
Id. at 211-12.
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The court then concluded that section 301 was intended by
the legislature to impose strict liability. The court gave three
reasons for arriving at such a conclusion:
74
1) The statutory language of section 301 is unambiguous.
"The clear import of this language is that if a person
alters the water's quality without a permit, he then has
violated the statute regardless of fault.76
2) When the EQA was passed in 1973, section 901 included
subsection (e), which had excused the operator of
polluting equipment from liability if the pollution was
caused by a breakdown beyond his control. 76 In 1974,7
however, the legislature repealed subsection (e),1
revealing a definite intent to hold operators responsible
even for discharges of pollution beyond their control. 78
3) The legislature had accepted by silence the provisions of
chapter IV of the Water Quality Rules and Regulations
promulgated by DEQ in May, 1978.79 Chapter IV
describes operator's liabilities in unequivocal terms:
negligence is not required to be in violation of section
301.80 The fact that the legislature had amended the
EQA twice since the promulgation of chapter IV and
had not overruled it was seen by the court as a sign that
the legislature had no quarrel with its provisions.8 1
Accordingly, section 301 was declared to be a strict liability
statute.8 2 This result was compelled by legislative intent as
74. See supra note 7.
75. 649 P.2d at 213 (emphasis in original).
76. 1973 Wyo. SEss. LAWS Ch. 250, S 35-487.49(e). Subsection (e) provides:
Pollution which is a direct result of the malfunctioning of breakdown of any
pollution source or related operating equipment beyond the control of the person owning or operating such source or equipment shall not be deemed in violation of this act, provided that prior to the initiation of any action hereunder by
the administrators, the owner or operator advises the proper administrator of
the circumstances and outlines an acceptable corrective program.
77. Subsection (e) was repealed by 1974 WYo. SEss. LAWS Ch. 14, S 2.
78. People v. Platte Pipe Line Co., 649 P.2d at 214 (Wyo. 1982).
79. Id.
80. Id. See also Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality, Water Quality Rules and
Regulations, Ch. IV (1978). Chapter IV is entitled "Regulations For Discharge Of Oil And
Hazardous Substances Into Waters Of The State Of Wyoming." The term "discharge" is

defined in section 3 to include "spilling" and "leaking." Section 4 states that a disc arge
into waters of the State is a violation of this regulation and the penalty provisions of the
Environmental Quality Act as amended may be imposed. Section 5 makes the person hav-

ing control over the oil or hazardous substance responsible for reporting, clean-up and all
liabilities and damages resulting from the discharge.
81. 649 P.2d at 214.
82. Id.
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well as by a belief that it would be more fair to pass the cost of
cleaning up an oil spill on to the consumers than to require the
taxpayers of the state to bear the burden without regard to
their actual oil consumption.8 s
The dissenting opinion stated that the strict liability issue
was properly one for the legislature and not for the courts to
decide, and the legislature had not elected to impose a strict
liability standard in section 301.84 The words "cause,"
"threaten," "allow" and "alter" that appear in section 301
were, in the dissent's opinion, words of volition and meant that
either willful intent or negligence was required to be in violation of that section.8 5 Furthermore, the dissent believed that
article three was enacted only to put Wyoming in compliance
with the federal NPDES, and therefore the unintended oil spill
in the instant case was beyond its scope. 86 The majority's argument concerning the enactment and subsequent repeal of
subsection (e)87 was declared irrelevant because there was
nothing in the trial record which suggested that a breakdown
had actually occurred.8 8 There was no mention of how the
history of subsection (e) might bear on the question of
legislative intent. Finally, the dissent discussed general intent
in the context of criminal law. Since general intent is normally
a required element of a crime, the dissent maintained that it
ought to have been required to constitute a violation of section
301.89
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION: STRICT LIABILITY

The Plattecourt decided that section 301 is a strict liability
statute. Unfortunately, however, the precise meaning of section 301 was left unexplained. A water polluter might still take
advantage of the ambiguity remaining in section 301 and avoid
liability altogether. This is because "strict liability" is an imprecise term, and the responsibility it imposes on the defen83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id. at 215 (Rooney, J., dissenting).
Id. at 216 (Rooney, J., dissenting).
Id. at 216-17 (Rooney, J., dissenting).
Id. at 213-14. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
649 P.2d at 218 (Rooney, J., dissenting).
Id. (Rooney, J., dissenting). The dissent's assertions with respect to criminal intent are
undoubtedly correct, but are completely irrelevant in light of the Wyoming Supreme
Court's holdingin Nickelson v. People, 607 P.2d 904 (Wyo. 1980), that the penalty provisions of the EQA are civil in nature. See supra note 67.
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dant can vary widely. At common-law, strict liability has
always been subject to a number of defenses because the plaintiff, even though he need not prove the fault of the defendant,
must still prove proximate cause. First, he must prove that his
injury is sufficiently related to the escape of the defendant's instrumentality; second, he must show that the defendant (and
not some external force) should be held responsible for that
escape.90
Strict liability as a legal concept can be traced to the
English case of Fletcher v. Rylands.9 1 In that case, the defendant had impounded water for use at a mill. At that time, such
a use of water was considered dangerous and "unnatural".
The impounded water seeped through some abandoned mine
workings whose presence on the defendant's land was
unknown to him, and flooded the plaintiff's land. Even though
the defendant was not at fault, the court held for the plaintiff,
adopting the now-famous rule of that case:
[One] who has brought something on his own property which was not naturally there, harmless to others
so long as it is confined to his own property, but which
he knows to be mischievous if it gets on his neighbour's,
should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does not succeed in confining it to his own property. But for his act in bringing it there no mischief
could have accrued, and it seems but just that he should
at his peril keep it there so that no mischief may accrue,
or answer 92for the natural and anticipated
consequences.
One can see the limitation of proximate cause applied to the
consequences of the water's escape, but it appeared that the
responsibility for the escape itself would always lie with the
property owner when he kept something "unnatural" on his
90. The "defenses" allowed in common-law strict liability are manifestations of plaintiff's inability to prove one of these elements of proximate cause. They include: 1) act of God, 2)
unforeseeable and independent act of a thirderson, and 3) assumption of risk. Also, the
whole concept of proximate cause is generaly more restricted in strict liability than in
negligence; plaintiff's damages must be of the kind that are said to lie within the risk to
which the defendant has subjected the community. See generally PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS S79 (4th ed. 1971). Cf. Harper, Liability Without FaultAnd ProximateCause, 30
MICH. L. REv. 1001, 1009 (1932) (the sequence of events must have been such that it is
not unfair to hold the defendant liable therefor).
91. 1 L.R. Ex. 265 (1866), affd sub nom. Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E&I App. 330 (1868).
92. Id., 1 L.R. Ex. at 280.
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land. His responsibility for the escape could never be avoided
completely by laying the blame on some external force, though
there might be no liability in a particular case if the plaintiff's
injury was not closely related to the escape of the owner's "unnatural" instrumentality.
The Rylands rule, however, did not remain this absolute.
Nine years later, in another reservoir-flood case, 93 the court
paid lip service to the principle of the defendant's absolute
responsibility for an escape of the "unnatural" instrumentality: "I am by no means sure that if a man kept a tiger, and
lightning broke the chain, and he got loose and did mischief,
that the man who kept him would not be liable." 94 The case,
however, was decided on a different rationale:
It is not the defendant who let loose the water and
sent it to destroy the bridges. She did indeed store it,
and store it in such quantities that, if it was let loose, it
would do, as it did, mischief. But suppose a stranger let
it loose, would the defendant be liable? If so, then if a
mischievous boy bored a hole in a cistern in any London
house, and the water did mischief to a neighbor, the occupier of the house would be liable. That cannot be.
Then why is the defendant liable if some agent
over
96
which she has no control lets the water out?
The court went on to hold that because a rainfall of unprecedented magnitude had caused the flood, the defendant
was not liable.9 6 One sees here how the second element of proximate cause comes into play. According to this view, the plaintiff's injury is caused, not by the defendant's impoundment of
water, but by the exceptionally heavy rainfall (act of God) or by
the mischievous boy with the auger (third party
intervention).97 The problem of proximate cause has always
been notoriously difficult, and courts have struggled with it for
years.9 8 On the surface the problem seems merely to be one of
93. Nichols v. Marsland, 10 L.R. Ex. 255 (1875).
94. Id. at 260.

95. Id. at 259.
96. Id. at 258-59.
97. For an American case where the court accepted this view even though strict liability for
escape of impounded water was based not on Rylands but on a statute, see Ryan Gulch
Reservoir v. Swartz, 234 P. 1059, 1062 (Colo. 1925).
98. For a description of the various aspects of the proximate cause problem, see PROSSER,
supra note 90, SS 41-45.
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semantics, that is, whether the court accepts the plaintiff's
definition of "cause" or the defendant's version.
On a more fundamental level, the problem of proximate
cause is one of deciding whether or not to transfer the loss suffered, and this depends on the particular social and economic
conditions of the time. When the industrial revolution began,
industry needed protection from its neighbors if it was to survive. Now it is the neighbors who need protection from industry. The theory of proper allocation of resources requires
that each enterprise in the economic system pay all the costs of
producing the product it sells.9 9 In other words, all production
costs should be internalized within the particular industry. Air,
land and water can no longer be considered free, and to the extent they are consumed by a particular industry they must be
paid for. The added cost is just one more cost of production.
These added costs are, to some extent, passed on to the consumer, 100 so the product's price in the end reflects the environmental as well as the pecuniary cost of its manufacture.
This economic principle is the foundation upon which many
modern environmental statutes rest. If an industry violates
the statutory prohibition and discharges pollution, it always
has a obligation to pay for the lost resources. Payment is in the
form of a penalty imposed by the government, and the government uses the money to clean up and repair the damage done.
The penalties imposed by these statutes are clearly defined
and limited, so the old limitations of proximate cause that protected the defendant by denying recovery when an improbable
chain of events ended with injury to the plaintiff are no longer
necessary. The purpose of these new statutes is to clean up
pollution rather than to impose retribution on the polluter, 10 1
and in order to do this the statute imposes absolute strict
liability on the owner of the offending facility. If any defenses
are appropriate they are named in the statute itself; the old
99. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts On Risk DistributionAnd The Law Of Torts, 70 YALE L.J.
499, 514 (1961).

100. Whether an enterprise's increased production costs are passed on to the consumer or absorbed by the enterprise depends, in a competitive market, on the elasticity of demand for
the product. SAMUELSON, ECONOMics 389-90 (10th ed. 1976). To the extent that the
enterprise's prices are regulated by the government, a fixed "reasonable rate of return
on capital" (i.e., profit) is allowed the enterprise. Increased costs therefore tend to be
more directly passed on to consumers. Posner, NaturalMonopoly andIts Regulation,21
STAN. L. REV. 548, 592 (1969).
101. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1151, 1162 (D. Conn. 1975).
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common-law defenses are no longer applicable. This absolute
strict liability is a statutory creation and is not the same legal
concept as the traditional strict liability that has been part of
the common-law since Fletcherv. Rylands.
The CWA is an example of a statute that creates absolute
strict liability. When the statute says that any discharge of
pollution without a permit is unlawful 102 it is never a defense to
10 3 Oil
show that some external force caused the discharge.
spills are covered by a different section of the CWA, but the
principle is the same: absolute strict liability is the rule unless
10 4
defenses are written into the statute.
GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING LIABILITY
FOR OIL SPILLS IN WYOMING

The EQA is a modern environmental statute of the kind
described above. The penalties due the State for violation of
section 301 are clearly defined and limited, 10 5 so the common
law limitations of proximate cause should not apply. Section
301 is a strict liability statute, and nowhere does the statute
explicitly mention any defenses. If any defenses are to be read
into the statute, they should be consistent with the statutory
purposes and the economic principles upon which thestatute is
based.
Crude oil is a valuable commodity, 0 6 and the pipeline
operator therefore has a natural incentive to keep the oil contained in his pipeline. Nevertheless, the EQA should provide a
supplemental incentive to the operator to do everything possible to prevent oil spills and to limit the quantity of oil lost if
they do occur. For this reason, the operator should be assigned
automatic responsibility for undertaking clean-up operations
(or costs if the State provides assistance) once the oil spill occurs. Also desirable is a discretionary penalty that may be
nominal in amount if a court finds the pipeline operator to have
acted responsibly, but substantial if the operator should be
102. See supra note 31.
103. SED, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 519 F. Supp. 979, 989 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
104. See supra text accompanying note 41.
105. See supra note 8.
106. The 8,552 barrels of crude oil lost in this spill had a market value of $140,602.66. Complaint, supra note 3, pt. III, at count no. 2.
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punished. The pipeline operator who avoids maintenance and
prevention costs because of bad faith or negligence should be
punished, not because the state has any reason to exact
retribution, but because it should be made clear to all that sloppy operations will not be tolerated in Wyoming. The argument
that it is too expensive to operate a pipeline in a way that protects the water and wildlife resources of Wyoming is simply
not realistic because it grotesquely distorts the priorities involved. The effect of a stiff penalty assessed against the
operator whose behaviour deserves it would be to discourage
others from behaving similarly, thereby eliminating the
preventable oil spill.
To a certain extent oil spills are inevitable, and may occur
despite the best efforts at prevention. In this respect they are
natural catastrophes, and the question arises: Who should pay
for these catastrophic events, the oil consumer or the Wyoming taxpayer? To the extent that consumers of the pipeline's oil
live out-of-state, the two groups of people do not overlap and
the group that benefits from the use of the oil should pay the
costs of inevitable mishaps associated with its transportation.
Equitable considerations are important. The oil industry
provides an essential service for the state and the nation, and
deserves to be treated as fairly as any other group in Wyoming. If one contemplates the assessment of penalties on an absolute strict liability basis, one must be careful to ensure the
penalties assessed are compensatory in nature unless punishment is deserved. 107 A policy of vindictiveness toward the oil
industry in Wyoming is inappropriate.
SUGGESTIONS FOR THE EQA

There is no conceivable situation in which the modern
pipeline operator ought to be relieved of its responsibility to
clean up after itself, so any litigation over certain defenses
that apply in the common-law strict liability situation would
107. See United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 589 F.2d 1305, 1310 (7th Cir. 1978) (Bauer,
Circuit Justice, concurring). Justice Bauer reasoned: "To punish a business engaged in
enterprises essential to our national well-being for an unfortunate accident when the
business is faultless, seems to be a self-defeating exercise of power. 'Strict liability' concepts normally refer to compensation, not punishment without fault" (emphasis in
original).
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merely be a waste of the court's time. For this reason, it ought
to be made very clear that section 301 is to be based on absolute strict liability. The Platte decision hints that strict
liability may already be the rule:
We further believe it makes sense to impose upon
the owner of a pipeline the monetary loss which results
from an oil spill. It is, after all, a cost of transporting the
oil.... As such, it can be passed on, to the extent proper, to those who consume the oil.... Such a system of
spreading the cost of an oil spill is immensely more fair
than requiring only the taxpayers of this state to bear
the burden without regard to their actual oil consumption.108

If this point had been made in more imperative and unconditional terms, we would have the explicit declaration needed.
Unfortunately, the language leaves room to argue that
common-law defenses are still available in a section 301 action.
These defenses should be abolished in this context, either by
unequivocal judicial construction or by legislative amendment.
The civil penalty set out in section 901(a)10 9 becomes a very
powerful tool once absolute liability is imposed, however, and
trial judges should exercise discretion in deciding the amount
to be assessed under this subsection. Even after absolute strict
liability is the rule, the operator whose conduct is exemplary in
cleaning up quickly and efficiently should be able to look forward to a minimal bill for the wildlife killed, no charge for state
clean-up efforts (state assistance not being necessary), and a
nominal penalty from the trial judge.
As presently written, the EQA has no explicit provision
that allows the state to recover costs it incurs in cleaning up
after an oil spill. If the operator is unable to clean up quickly
and effectively, the state must step in because the job cannot
go undone. Any money the state does expend in responding to
the spill should be quickly reimbursed. As matters now stand,
the state may recover these costs under the federal CWA 110
(assuming that none of the named defenses apply), but it is
108. 649 P.2d at 214.
109. See supra note 8.
110. 33 U.S.C. S 1321(fX4) and (5) (Supp. V 1981).
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doubtful whether a Wyoming district court has jurisdiction to
hear such a claim arising under the federal statutes. 1 1 There is
no reason why the state should have to bring two actions, one
in state court and one in federal court, for the same event. The
legislature should amend section 901 to specifically provide for
recovery by the state of all costs its agencies incur in the
restoration of natural habitat after an oil spill.
CONCLUSION

The Wyoming Supreme Court decided in Platte that the
EQA imposes strict liability for any unpermitted discharge of
water pollution. The decision was based on the language of the
statute itself and on inferences of legislative intent. Platte is a
big step in the right direction, but the strict liability policy
declared therein needs to be refined.
If the EQA is to accomplish its vital purpose of protecting
Wyoming's waters and wildlife from pollution, it is essential
that the principles of liability for violation of its provisions be
adequately defined and enforced. It should be made clear that
section 301 is an absolute strict liability statute and that there
are no defenses once an unpermitted discharge of pollution into state waters has occurred. The pipeline operator's responsibility to undertake clean-up operations should be automatic,
but any penalty assessed against the operator should depend
on its behaviour both before and after the spill. In this way unnecessary litigation could be avoided, the duty to undertake
clean-up operations would be placed on the operator where it
belongs, and the prevention of oil spills would be encouraged
without the imposition of unjustifiable harsh penalties in the oil
industry.
JAMES M. ELLERBE

111. 28 U.S.C. S 1355 (1976) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of any action or proceeding for the recovery of any

fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, incurred under any act of Congress.
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